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Organization change failure has typically been viewed as occurring when expected outcomes 
of change have not been met. This view downplays key, but frequently hidden organizational 
dimensions such as deep structures and temporality. In this paper, drawing inspiration from 
the story of Alice in Wonderland (Carroll, 2011), we distinguish between surface level 
intervention approaches to change, deeper process approaches and, deeper yet structuration 
approaches and suggest the different ways they approach change failure as well as the 
implications of these.  On the basis of our exploration we propose a three-fold way forward: 
adopting a process-based, empirically grounded and reflective approach to understanding 
change and its often-failed outcomes; adopting methodologies that can capture deep structures 
and temporal dimensions; and incorporating expanded conceptions of time as a multi-level, 
nested construct.  We illustrate our ideas of deep structures and temporality by drawing from 
a particularly important illustration of long term successful change that includes multiple 
short term failures, that of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the United 
States (NASA).  
 
Keywords:   Change Failure, intervention, process approaches, deep structures, temporality, 
Structuration theory, NASA, Alice in Wonderland 
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Organization change failure, deep structures and temporality: Appreciating 
Wonderland 
Introduction 
In this essay we show how understandings and meanings of organizational change failure 
require exploration not only of surface events and processes that take place in change, but also 
of underlying events and processes that are rarely explored or articulated as playing central 
roles in change failure.  Thus, we discuss change and change failure on multiple levels, both 
seen and unseen.   
To do so we draw inspiration from Alice in Wonderland, a novel written by Lewis 
Carroll (2011) in 1865 about a young girl named Alice who falls down a rabbit hole into a 
fantasy world full of illogical events.  Alice has been one of the best-known books in the 
English-speaking world for well over a century.  It “exemplifies the profound questioning of 
reality which characterizes the mainstream of nineteenth-century English literature” (Rackin, 
1966, p. 313).  Thus, it prompts us to consider dimensions that are central to change failure 
even if they are unrecognized.  Further, it does this in a way that is likely to be particularly 
memorable.  Boris (2017) and Polkinghorne (1988), among others, make evident that stories 
are much more memorable and evoke much stronger human responses than do statements of 
fact or theoretical arguments. The story of Alice illustrates and stimulates important meanings 
and emotions that are integral parts of the theoretical constructs we discuss. 
Organizational scholars and practitioners writing about organizational change often 
use metaphors from Alice in Wonderland.  For example, Ainsworth (2012), de Rooy, (2018).  
Gibbons (2015), Holman (2013), Lund Dean & Forray, 2017 and Somekh (2005), among 
others, have discussed aspects of change initiatives in terms of going into or down the rabbit 
hole.  Kanter (1989: 19) described how the environmental context for many current 
companies is the croquet game in Wonderland “because everything is alive and changing 
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around the player—an all-too- real condition for many managers”.  McCabe (2016: 946) 
talked about how, in contrast to most metaphors of organizations, Alice in Wonderland draws 
“attention to that which is ridiculous, irrational, disordered, unpredictable, uncertain, 
unexpected, stupid, inane, nonsensical, contradictory or just plain silly”. In other words, the 
story of Alice going down the rabbit hole into Wonderland has been wonderfully evocative 
for those engaged in understanding organizations and organizational change and especially 
their “underground”, apparently nonsensical dimensions.   
 While Alice in Wonderland has inspired a good deal of writing about organizations 
and change in them, the story has not been used as a metaphor and lens for making sense of 
change failure. Yet there is considerable recognition that failure is a very frequent component 
of organizational change, and that it frequently doesn’t seem to make sense.   
Thus, stimulated by the experiences of Alice in Wonderland, the purpose of this essay 
is to explore the underground dimensions of organization change failure in comparison to its 
more surface manifestation.  More specifically, we will explore the deep structures and 
complex temporal dimensions associated with organizational change failure that are hidden 
from view.  As Kelly (2011: 21) notes, “Alice is ‘our’ representative” for this task. 
Much like Alice going down the rabbit hole into Wonderland, the more we explore, 
the more there is to find. While the meaning of “change failure” appear clear on the surface, 
upon investigation we discover that different views of change failure imply different 
perspectives on what failure actually involves and what its causes might be.  Like 
Wonderland itself, such a state of affairs mirrors and engages with the complexity of the 
organizational change field much better than the way the field often speaks of itself.   
This essay includes several parts.  First, we address how scholars and practitioners 
frequently address organizational change failure on the surface (what we are labelling change 
as intervention), including an illustrative vignette from the history of the Xerox Corporation 
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that shows why surface understandings are inadequate for understanding change failure.  
Second, we begin to go “down the rabbit hole” to explore more in-depth dimensions of 
change (which we are labelling change as process).   Deeper still, we encounter deep 
structures and temporal dimensions (which we are labelling change as structuration).  Here 
we also include illustrative vignettes from NASA.  We conclude by suggesting implications 
for organizational change research and practice.   
We introduce each section with brief notes or quotations from Alice.  These stimulate 
the imagination and set the tone for the sections.  
Surface failure:  Change as intervention 
The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. `Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?' he 
asked.  “Begin at the beginning,” the King said, very gravely, “and go on till you come to the 
end: then stop.”   
The ubiquity of change failure   
The concept of change failure itself is most frequently treated in an orderly way as 
unproblematic, prominently defined as occurring when a change program does not meet its 
stated goals, as noted for example by Beer, (2000), Hammer and Champy (1993), Hughes 
(2011); Jorgensen, Owen & Neus (2009); Kotter, (1996; 2008); Michael & Mirvis (1977), 
Thomas, George & Rose, (2016) and others.   As an illustration of this perspective, Nutt 
(1992: 320) argued that: “Failures occur during planned change when plans are not 
implemented or when they are withdrawn because performance fails to meet expectations”.   
On the surface, change failure apparently occurs quite frequently.  Multiple authors 
argue that 60-70% of changes fail (e.g. Jorgensen et al., 2009; Jorgensen, Bruehl & Franke, 
2014; Maurer, 2010; Thomas et al., 2016).  Yet, this agreement is often without evidence, a 
point that Hughes (2011) makes abundantly clear. 
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When considered on the surface, the causes of change failure appear to be somewhat 
straightforward.  An IBM report (Jorgensen et al., 2014) suggests that these include a lack of 
clarity about change management benefits and activities, lack of clarity about the role of a 
change professional, lack of change management resources, and, relatedly, change 
management being too expensive.  Other sources of failure that have been commonly 
discussed include, among others, lack of planning, insufficient leadership, inadequate 
communication, or actions inconsistent with change model employed (e.g. Anderson, 2018; 
Raelin & Cataldo, 2011).  A frequently discussed cause is resistance to change from 
employees (e.g. Battilana & Casciaro, 2013; Vales, 2007).   
 But despite the agreed-upon claim of a high failure rate, and despite all the factors that 
cause failure, organizations keep changing.  Why would this occur when there is such 
(unsubstantiated) agreement that the success of change is so unlikely? One likely answer is 
that the picture is more complex than assumed.  It depends on the perspective of change 
employed; which itself implies different causes or attributions of failure.  
Avoiding change failure on a surface level   
Given this view of failure and its comparatively straightforward causes, a voluminous 
literature offers clear, step-by-step prescriptions for how to accomplish planned change 
successfully (e.g. Basford & Schaninger, 2016; Beer & Nohria, 2000; Kanter, 1999; Kotter, 
1996; Schantz, 2017). As Schantz (2017) noted, these often include instructions such as 
follow a process, start with the executives, pay attention to the individual change process, 
focus on managers, and so forth.  For example, lack of resource planning is an issue because 
change “generally is a longer and costlier endeavor than most change leaders realize. If you 
don’t plan and resource the latter phases of change, you’ll not realize the full benefits you set 
out to achieve” (Ackerman, 2018).  This all assumes linear causality. 
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Perhaps the cornerstone model that inspired this literature is Lewin’s (1947: 35) 
pronouncement that “a successful change includes therefore three aspects: unfreezing (if 
necessary) the present level L1, moving to the new level L2, and freezing new life on the new 
level.” The organization change field has made much more of this side-comment than Lewin 
(1947) intended, elevating it to a field-shaping paradigm (Bartunek & Woodman, 2015; 
Cummings, Bridgman & Brown, 2016).   
 Prescriptive approaches to organization change typically present models that treat 
change as a series of episodes or stages that occur within a setting that would otherwise be 
considered fairly stable and in which the nature of causality is clear; and so is what should be 
done (e.g. Bennis, 1965; Kotter, 1996; Levy, 1986). As Michael and Mirvis (1977: 312) put 
it, “Central (to these models) is the belief that reality is comprised of discrete objects and 
events, interacting in sequences that can be understood as chains of causes and effects”. 
Addressed to management and change leaders, and based on these beliefs, these models are 
commonly composed of multiple steps, with the assumption that if these are properly 
followed, they lead to successful change outcomes. Change episodes thus have a beginning, 
intervening actions, and, following how the field interpreted Lewin (1947), a definite and 
presumably successful end (e.g. Stouten et al., 2018; Werkman, 2009). 
 However, accomplishing surface level change successfully is more complex than the 
literature typically suggests.   Consider the following example. 
Vignette: Xerox and its apparent change successes 
In the 1980s, Xerox undertook several re-organizations to respond to Japanese 
competition in the copier market. Paul Allaire, Xerox’s CEO between 1990 to 1999, noted in 
an interview that “in the 1980s we went through a number of reorganizations. But none of 
them got at the fundamental question of how we run the company” (Allaire, 1992: 107). 
During Allaire’s tenure, Xerox set out to transform the not only the structures, processes, and 
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human resource aspects of the company, but also the underlying value system, what Allaire 
referred to as the “informal culture” (what we refer to later as the “legitimation” dimension of 
deep structures). Xerox aimed to change from a functional corporate design to a matrix one, 
ultimately aiming to create large numbers of self-organizing teams that draw from shared 
corporate services. While Xerox was partially successful in gaining back lost market share in 
the copier market from the Japanese, it persistently failed to recognise the immense 
commercial potential of the game-changing technologies that its Palo Alto Research Center 
(PARC) had created (Smith & Alexander, 1988). Instead, these technologies were either 
copied by other companies or commercialized by Xerox scientists who left the company to do 
so (Chesbrough, 2002).  
Xerox’s dominant logic of what the company was about (what we refer to later as the 
“signification” dimension of seep structures) was focused on the copier market. The company 
was caught in a competency trap with intertwined cognitive, behavioral and organizational 
dimensions that hindered the executives from recognising and capitalizing on the ground-
breaking technologies that PARC had invented (Heracleous et al., 2017). Because those 
executives controlled what Giddens (1984) called allocative (material) and authoritative 
(hierarchical) resources (what we refer to later as the “domination” dimension of deep 
structures), Xerox was caught in a perfect storm of its deep structures hindering any 
meaningful organization change towards commercializing the new technologies that would 
enable the company to expand from the copier market to potentially lead the broader 
information technology industry. This process took place beneath the surface of several 
apparently successful change interventions that had met their stated goals.  
In other words, Xerox’s reorganizations in the 1980s, even though deemed successful 
in terms of restructuring the company, failed to change the company’s deep structures.  
Further, the company’s transformation change efforts in the 1990s, even though successful in 
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creating a more adaptive, customer-focused organization, failed to change or extend the 
dominant logic of the company (that is, change the “signification” dimension of its deep 
structures) from copiers to the broader information technology domain.  
Xerox’s story illustrates apparently successful change at the surface level, as well as 
change failure at the deep levels. While Xerox’s change interventions were a success in terms 
of meeting their goals, they were a failure in terms of change in the deep structures of the 
organization. This disjuncture ultimately led to Xerox missing its chance to commercialise 
several of its ground-breaking technologies and become a much more influential industry 
actor than it is today.  
When we view change as involving longer-term trajectories of organizations where 
change is ongoing, not necessarily under the banner of any particular surface organizational 
intervention, the causes of failure come to be recognized as complex and multi-dimensional.  
They often involve deeper structural and temporal dimensions (e.g. Dooley, 1997; Pettigrew, 
Woodman & Cameron, 2001).  Thus, we must begin to look beneath the surface of change to 
understand failure or potential success more adequately. 
We outline in Table 1 below the views of change failure and attributions of change 
failure of three views of change: change as intervention, change as process, and change as 
structuration; and we explore these ideas further below.  
  -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Table 1 about here 
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
Entrance to the rabbit hole: Change as process  
 In wonderland “(the dodo) marked out a race-course, in a sort of circle, (`the exact 
shape doesn't matter,' it said,) and then all the party were placed along the course, here and 
there. There was no `One, two, three, and away,' but they began running when they liked, and 
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left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over.” Carroll, 
2011: 88) 
Pettigrew (1985, 1987, 1992), Johnson (1987) and others championed a process view 
of change that involves understanding broader aspects of the content, context and process of 
change over time. From this perspective change may have a beginning or may be ongoing, 
rather than viewing change as a periodic intervention aimed at switching direction or 
organizational design towards a particular goal.  
A process perspective draws attention to the complex relationship between success 
and failure. For example, Sitkin (1992) argued that continued success may engender liabilities 
such as restricted search, reduced attention, complacency, risk aversion and homogeneity. He 
further argued that small “strategic” or “intelligent” failures can lead to higher organizational 
resilience via greater attention to and recognition of potential problems, increased search for 
solutions, motivation to adapt, risk tolerance and requisite variety.  Michael and Mirvis 
(1977) also noted that it is more valuable to think of apparent failures in terms of errors from 
which it is possible to learn important information for further development. From a process 
perspective the idea of change as a planned series of discrete stages with a beginning and a 
successful end (or failure if the planned end is not reached) is questionable.   
As Tsoukas and Chia (2002) argued from a “strong process” perspective 
(Jarzabkowski, Le & Spee, 2017), in a field that has assumed stability as the foundation, 
organizations are instead continually in flux and becoming. Thus, change is far from a 
discrete and extraordinary set of events.  Rather, it is the normal order of things, though 
normal doesn’t mean what it does above ground.  For Alice, change subverts the normal 
linear progression (Kelly, 2011: 36).  If change is continuous, and sometimes circular, and 
sometimes backwards (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Mantere, Schildt, &  Sillince, 2012) and 
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is the fundamental nature of organizations, their very ontology, then the distinction between 
change success and failure becomes rather moot from this perspective.  
From a process viewpoint we could rather focus on the trajectory/ies of the 
organization and the unfolding of its processes (Chia & Holt, 2009; Van de Ven & Poole, 
2005) in whatever directions they go or stay. Here, “the world is composed of events and 
experiences rather than substantial entities. Each event arises out of, and is constituted 
through, its relations to other events. Each event can be further analysed in terms of smaller 
events” (Langley et al., 2013: 5). As Farjoun (2010) showed, stability and change are not just 
oppositional but also complementary, simultaneously present, and mutually engendering.  
Similarly, success and failure are defined in terms of each other, they interpenetrate, and can 
co-exist.  
Finally, a process perspective does not invalidate reference to change interventions per 
se, of the type analyzed by Kotter (1996), Beer and Nohria (2000), and others; or an 
understanding of attributions of change failure from the perspective of change as intervention. 
Rather, this perspective adds further dimensions, pieces of the puzzle, to appreciation of a 
complex problem. Apparent unintended consequences of a change are simply part of the 
process (Jian, 2007) 
As we outlined in Table 1, the “change as process” perspective as expounded by 
Pettigrew (1985, 1987) for example views change failure as deviation from expected goals, 
along similar lines to the “change as intervention” perspective. However, it views the causes 
as more complex, related to dis-junctures or tensions across changes occurring along multiple 
organizational dimensions. Johnson’s (1992) “cultural web” model that integrates diverse, 
interrelated organizational aspects such as rituals and routines, stories and myths, symbols, 
power structures, organization structures and control systems is an example of this reasoning. 
Further, from a “strong process” perspective (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), failure would be rooted 
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in antecedents present in and recurring through routinized action in the ongoing flow of 
events, such as inertial patterns of actions or embedded worldviews.  
Underground in wonderland: Change as structuration 
Organizational research that remains on the surface, looking for rational events and 
linear causes, is unlikely to find patterns such as the judgment scene in the last chapter of 
Alice in Wonderland in which the King “said to the jury in a low, trembling voice”, “consider 
your verdict”.  But the White Rabbit replied, “There’s more evidence to come yet, please your 
Majesty” (Carroll, 2011: 166). There often is more evidence yet to come about change failure 
(or not), and it is likely to require much deeper exploration to be appreciated. 
The wonderland into which Alice fell is full of contradictions, (Kelly, 2011). To name 
just a few, when Alice makes use of advice from the mushroom, she inadvertently convinces 
the pigeon that she is a serpent, and so is dangerous.  A baby who is being treated shabbily 
turns into a pig.  Alice knocks on a door but can’t get it opened because the footman who is 
supposed to open it is on the same side she is.   
The contradictions in these examples are crucial structural features of the story; they 
call into question “the essence” of time and space (Kelly, 2011: 37). As Rackin (1966: 314) 
comments, in Wonderland “old assumptions- … that longitude and latitude can always plot 
position, that size and growth must be fairly regular- have already proven ridiculously 
invalid” and “the ordinary concept of Space, too, is already on its way to oblivion”.    
In other words, to understand change and its failure without appreciating its 
underlying contradictory dimensions is absurd.  To understand change failure properly, it is 
necessary that we also cast aside surface-level assumptions about straightforward reasons for 
change failure and explore change from a subterranean perspective.  This necessarily includes 
deep structures and complex temporal dimensions of change.  
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Of course, organization change can sometimes fail for straightforward reasons such as 
those we discussed above or erroneous diagnosis of what needs to change (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987). But deep structure and temporal dimensions of change have not received sufficient 
attention, with the result that crucial aspects of organization change failure have remained 
unrecognised.   
Deep Structures  
  Kelly (2011, 26) notes that in Alice in Wonderland the reader encounters “the 
terrifying vision of the void that underlies the comfortable structures of the rational world.”  
Or, one might say, the reader encounters the deep structures of wonderland.  The 
contradictions and inconsistencies there mirror those found in the deep structures of many 
organizational settings (Sköldberg, 1994). 
Deep structures as enduring dimensions of social systems that shape surface events. 
Deep structures are enduring aspects of social systems that operate at a subterranean level of 
social reality and shape events and actions on the observable, surface level. Deep structures 
have been central to a number of fields and can be found in semiotics (Fiol, 1989, 1991), 
narrative analysis (Sköldberg, 1994), organizational analysis (Dandridge, Mitroff & Joyce, 
1980; Gersick, 1991; Gomez & Jones, 2000; Light, 1979), sociology (Giddens, 1984) and 
structuralism (Saussure, 1983), among others.  
Gersick (1991) described a deep structure as a “highly durable underlying order”, 
which is “what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what 
disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary 
punctuations” (1991: 12). Deep structures involve a “set of fundamental ‘choices’ a system 
has made of (1) the basic parts into which its units will be organized and (2) the basic activity 
patterns that will maintain its existence” (Gersick, 1991: 14). They may be “barely 
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articulated” (Macintosh & MacLean, 1999: 305) but shape surface events including 
organizational change.   
Giddens (1984: 326) suggested that his theory could be used as a “sensitizing device” 
for studying organizations.  In this spirit, we draw from structuration theory as an inspiration 
for our “change as structuration” perspective as outlined in Tables 1 and 2.  Structuration 
theory has been fruitful in guiding empirical research in a number of fields (Jones & Karsten, 
2008; Pozzebon, 2004) can be a useful meta-theoretical basis in this endeavor. We draw from 
Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory to identify three dimensions of deep structures: 
signification, domination, and legitimation. Signification refers to shared meanings; 
domination refers to power via the control of resources; legitimation refers to underlying 
norms.   
A linguistic metaphor can clarify the signification dimension.  Saussure’s (1983, p. 6) 
structural linguistics aimed “to determine the forces operating permanently and universally in 
all languages, and to formulate general laws which account for all particular linguistic 
phenomena historically attested”. In this formulation, everything that is said (langue) is 
shaped by deeper structures (parole), the specific, underlying rules of grammar through which 
unlimited spoken statements are generated and shaped. In semiotics, one aspect of deep 
structures is the underlying semantic oppositions that shape meaning in texts or groups of 
texts (Fiol, 1989, 1991).  
That is, deep structures include tacit knowledge and conventions (Gomez and Jones, 
2000) that may be reflected in narrative.  For example, Sköldberg (1994) viewed 
reorganizations as drama, and explored the “hidden pattern” (p. 221) underlying them. He 
found that the narrative conventions of tragedy and romantic comedy acted as competing deep 
structures, and their interaction formed a third, paradoxical, mode of “fragmented satire” (p. 
219), something like wonderland itself.  
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 With respect to legitimation, deep structures have a normative aspect and encompass 
deeply held values. For Dandridge et al. (1980) for example the study of organizational 
symbols can reveal the unconscious shared values that they viewed as the deep structure of 
organizations. In particular, Dandridge et al. noted the “system maintenance” function of 
organizational symbols, in terms of “providing coherence, order and stability”, as well as 
“guiding acceptable patterns for change” (1980: 79). Schein (1990) referred to such 
unconscious shared values as an organization’s basic underlying assumptions, the deepest of 
three levels of organization culture. 
 With respect to domination, the role of power via control of resources has been an 
enduring aspect of organizational analysis (Krackhardt, 1990).  This dimension includes the 
potential dominance of any particular ideology and the emergence of dominant groups.  It 
also includes the mobilization of power to implement, benefit from and/or to subvert 
organization change (Greiner & Schein, 1988) as well as the possibility of power emerging 
though a kind of snowball process, rather than linearly (Sköldberg, 1994). 
The appreciation of deep structures and their dimensions helps to expand  recognition 
of what both change failure and change success may mean. For example, failure in particular 
change efforts may be occurring at the same time as ongoing, gradual shifts in deep structures 
over longer temporal frames that are intended to align the organization with its environment, 
as we will show later has been the case at NASA. Conversely, particular change programs 
may be deemed as successful, at the same time as the deep structures of the organization may 
be inertial or shifting away from environmental demands, as our Xerox vignette has shown. 
 Aspects of deep structures such as enduring underlying (contradicting) values and 
motivations derive from the historical trajectory of the organization and corresponding 
experiences of organizational actors (cf. Greiner, 1967).  As Pettigrew (1992) argued, social 
reality is constructed in a “process of structural emergence via actions, and the tension 
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between actions and structures is the ultimate moving force of the process … the legacy of the 
past is always shaping the emerging future” (1992: 8). Despite some notable exceptions (e.g. 
Bordia et al., 2011; Greiner, 1967, Sköldberg, 1994), these considerations have not been 
substantially heeded in most organization change research, which often remains at the surface 
rather than being historical and cognizant of the nature and effects of deep structures.   
Thus, the notion of deep structures suggests that there is much more to underlying 
organizing than organizations and their members are aware of.  Applied to organizational 
change, it suggests that there is also much more to organizational failure and success than 
organization members, consultants, and scholars are aware of, and that much of what is 
crucial may have contradictory components.  
As we outlined in Table 1, scholars that have employed structuration theory (e.g. 
Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Schwieger et al., 2004) also tend to view change failure as 
occurring when change goals, within time and budget, are not met. However, the attributions 
of change failure from this perspective centre on dis-junctures between changes occurring on 
the surface vs changes (or the lack of them) occurring in deeper dimensions. Such studies 
have also identified more explicitly the polyphonic nature of change and how competing 
conceptualizations or worldviews (signification dimensions of deep structures in terms of the 
above discussion) may derail any attempted changes on the surface.  
Vignette: Deep Structures at NASA 
The concept of deep structures sheds light on why we can observe organizations that 
over time are able to change their business logic radically, even as individual change 
programs appear to fail. Consider the case of NASA, founded in 1958, and since then in 
charge of the US civilian space program, along with aeronautics and aerospace research. 
Studies of NASA have lamented the challenges of accomplishing change in the 
agency (Donahue & O’Leary, 2012), and the path-dependence of the organization 
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(Bruggeman, 2002). Yet, NASA’s deeper business logic (its deep structure) has shifted 
gradually over the decades from a hierarchical model during the Apollo program in the 1960s, 
to an international inter-governmental partnerships model with the construction and operation 
of the International Space Station in the 1990s, and then to an inter-organizational networks 
model with the Commercial and Crew Resupply Programs in the 2000s (Heracleous, Terrier 
and Gonzalez, 2018). This overall logic has provided an umbrella for a number of other 
institutional logics, often conflicting, that co-exist within the organization. These include 
logics of managerial rationalism, project management and scientific professionalism, and 
organizational persistence (Berente & Yoo, 2012).  At any point in time, NASA’s deep 
structure, in this case expressed as its overall business logic and its various institutional 
logics, shapes surface events. Particular change initiatives have failed, but NASA continues to 
operate as the leading space agency in the world.   
In other words, NASA shows that the failure of particular organization changes does 
not necessarily imply that there is no change at a deeper level to align with environmental 
demands and stakeholder expectations (Heracleous et al., 2018). Despite challenges in 
particular change initiatives NASA (like some other organizations such as BP (Ruddle, 2008) 
and IBM (O’Reilly, Harreld & Tushman, 2009) is able to change its deeper business logics in 
substantial ways, and may do so several times over the decades, usually not in a linear 
progression. Our understanding of change failure can therefore be more nuanced if it can take 
into account both surface change programs and deep structures and how these may be 
interrelated in particular organizations, as well as the temporal trajectories involved.  
 As the NASA example illustrates, deep structures are so influential because they are 
enduring, and this enduringness shows how closely, as we will show below, deep structures 
and temporality are intertwined in ontological terms.  Deep structures shape organizational 
life because they manifest through practices that are routinized, and continuously re-enacted 
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over time. The concept of reversible time also captures this repetitive, recursive process of 
actions and events shaped by deep structures. As Giddens (1984: 36) notes, “the reversible 
time of institutions is both the condition and the outcome of the practices organized in the 
continuity of daily life, the main substantive form of the duality of structure”. The concept of 
duality of structure captures the idea that routinised social practices not only result from, but 
also perpetuate structures (Giddens, 1984).  
Temporal dimensions 
Temporality starts Alice’s adventure (Beer, 2011). It was when the white rabbit 
looked at the watch in this waistcoat pocket that Alice started following him to wonderland. 
“Before her was another long passage, and the White Rabbit was still in sight, hurrying down 
it. There was not a moment to be lost: away went Alice like the wind, and was just in time to 
hear it say, as it turned a corner, ‘Oh my ears and whiskers, how late it's getting!’” (Carroll, 
2011: 70).   
The Hatter has his own problems with time, who “’won't do a thing I ask! It's always 
six o'clock now” and thus, always tea time, never giving the chance to clean up from the last 
tea time.  Further, for the Hatter time isn’t “it.  It’s him” (Carroll, 2011: 130).   
As Rackin (1966: 320) argues,  
Such a view of Time as finite and personal, of course, comically subverts the 
above-ground convention of Time's infinite, orderly, autonomous nature. This 
finally puts Time in its proper place-another arbitrary, changeable artifact that has 
no claim to absolute validity, no binding claim, in fact, to existence. 
In Wonderland time is certainly not the logical, linear sequence as imagined by Lewin (1947).   
Time is also not orderly and autonomous in organizational change processes.  Thus, 
the second set of ideas that helps us contextualize the concept of change failure centers on 
   pg. 19 
temporality in organizational change (Bartunek & Woodman, 2015; Huy, 2001; Kunisch, 
Bartunek, Mueller & Huy., 2017.  We will begin with discussions of clock and event time. 
The type of time that is most often used in surface considerations of change is clock 
time (e.g. Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence & Tushman, 2001: 514).  This approach considers 
time as a “continuum as linear-infinitely divisible into objective, quantifiable units” such as 
days, weeks, reporting cycles and years.  It assumes that change unfolds linearly as a clock 
ticks.  Consistent with this notion, specific outcomes of organizational change are often 
expected to occur within a certain time period, and if this doesn’t happen they are deemed to 
be failures.   
The notion of event time suggests that time gains particular significance in important 
events (e.g. Hernes, 2017), such as, for example, the introduction of new policies or a new 
leader.  Some approaches to success assume that it should occur by the time of a particular 
event (Gersick, 1994); otherwise the change program has failed.  
But time can get frozen at tea time, can go backwards, can shift shapes and can take 
many other dimensions as well. Organizational scholars such as Albert (2013), Albert & 
Bartunek, 2017, Barrett (2012a), Bluedorn, (2002), Hernes (2017) and Kunisch et al., (2017), 
have shown how much there is much more to temporal dimensions of change than linear 
dimensions.  Barrett (2012b) in particular, discussing his book about jazz and management 
“Yes to the Mess”, talked about  
the mess that we all face on a daily basis as the pace of change quickens. We live 
in a high-velocity world with so many cues and signals that don't come to us with 
clear messages. We are constantly interpreting vague cues, and we have these 
unstructured tasks. And we have no guarantee whether our actions are going to be 
successful or not. We don't know the consequences of our actions. So we're 
constantly faced with a barrage of possibilities that could go in several directions.   
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We will focus on just a few of these possible temporal directions; urgency, temporal 
focus, temporal depth, and polyphony.  These are all underground characteristics of 
organizational change that are likely to be implicated in its success or failure however and 
whenever these are considered. 
 The term “urgency” refers to “a consistent concern with the passage of time, with 
those higher in time urgency feeling generally hurried across situations (Shipp and Cole 
(2015: 243).”  As Kunisch et al. (2017) summarize, among other things, urgency leads to a 
perception of tight deadlines (Conte, Rizzuto, & Steiner, 1999); which in turn leads to faster 
pacing, which in turn shortens the deadlines associated with change initiatives (Yakura, 
2002).  Finally, urgency often decreases the ability to coordinate with others (Leroy et al., 
2015).  The more the sense of urgency, the less time there is for successful change.   
 Temporal focus addresses how much people pay attention to the past, present, or 
future (e.g. Bluedorn, 2002), their past memories, what is happening now, and what the future 
may hold.  Change leaders’ temporal foci affect their approaches to change.  For example, 
Karniol and Ross (1996: 595) suggested that people with a future temporal focus “imagine 
various futures (and) . . . select their preferred end states” and then plan to achieve these.  
Strobel et al. (2013) suggested that a present temporal focus might lead people to emphasize 
immediate, short-term, proximal goals, while a past temporal orientation may lead people to 
complete unfinished business (e.g. Rafferty & Restubog, 2010).  In other words, temporal 
focus affects what success and failure might mean, and whether people are aware of this or 
not. It also affects when such assessment might be meaningful.  
 Temporal depth refers to how far back “into the past and future that individuals and 
collectivities typically consider when contemplating events that have happened, may have 
happened, or may happen” (Bluedorn & Standifer, 2006: 201).  Nadkarni et al. (2016: 1133) 
emphasize, “short time horizons provide flexibility and quick adaptation but also … temporal 
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myopia and economic short termism … Long-time horizons lend foresight in management but 
delay short-term adaptation to changing environmental conditions.”   
There are, of course, counter examples when one considers issues of urgency and 
temporal focus and depth.  For example, apparently successful change in the short term can be 
deemed a failure in 2-3 years, such as in re-engineering programs (Hammer, 1990), where 
cost reductions almost inevitably involve mass layoffs (Grint & Case, 1998) that can reflect 
positively on organizational performance initially, but also lead to capability erosion that soon 
becomes obvious and leads to performance declines. From this perspective, change failure or 
success are to an extent a matter of temporal perspective as well as a matter of which level 
(surface events or deep structures) is being examined. The limitations of the received view of 
change failure as occurring when the expected outcomes are not reached are apparent. Things 
are not as simple as saying that a change program is successful if it meets its objectives, or a 
failure if it doesn’t.  
 Finally, Barrett’s (2012a) work makes evident the importance of attending to 
polyphony as a temporal dimension associated with determining success.  Organizationally 
this refers to a time when multiple events are happening simultaneously, and how well their 
pacing meshes with each other affects how successfully any particular change will occur.   
Musically, polyphony is 'a form of composition in which multiple melodies are performed at 
the same time, each retaining its own individuality as it harmonizes with others' (Albert, 
2013: 155); in jazz it may be like a jam session (Barrett, 2012a). As we have shown, in 
Wonderland Alice encountered multiple activities going on apparently simultaneously, each 
somewhat independent of each other. 
Vignette: Temporality at NASA 
Several analyses of NASA (e.g. Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011, Heracleous et al., 
2018) follow a view of event time (Gersick, 1994).  They trace the significance of key events 
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such as NASA’s defining projects and accomplishments, as well as its setbacks, on the 
themes the analyses are exploring. Certainly, NASA has experienced its share of failures 
(Fox, 2009; Rogers, 2018).  However, as we will discuss below, the meanings of success and 
failure of particular events depend on other temporal dimensions as well as those usually 
assumed. 
Looking at NASA’s history from a long term perspective makes evident that tragic 
accidents have acted as events that shaped aspects of the deep structures of the organization, 
such as the value of safety as a fundamental aspect of everything the agency does (Terrier, 
Heracleous & Gonzalez, 2017: 23).  According to the agency’s Chief Technologist, the 
organization’s values and emphasis on safety have acted as a shaping constraint to changes in 
various organizational aspects, including mission control: 
If you go in the old control room over here, the Apollo control room, with the 
ancient technology. We used that up to 1996. So you'll see the new control room 
with the computers and so on, and you see the old one, with analog technology 
and tubes. … So you'd say, ‘Why would you do that?’ And the organization would 
respond, ‘Because even though I know - not that I'm stupid and I didn't know 
there's much better technology –  but ‘I have known for 20 years, every fault, 
every possible scenario, every possible mistake, every possible anomaly, and I 
know how to deal with it, so I can never be surprised. The moment I introduce the 
new technology, man, now I've got a learning curve’. Who wants to be the guy 
that's the flight director on that learning curve when these lives are at stake? Even 
when I'm aware that there's a better system, I'm not taking the risk, right.    
 This quote suggests that, at least with regard to safety, NASA does not feel a sense of 
urgency to adopt new ideas immediately.  Rather, NASA’s temporal focus includes the past 
as well as the future; it keeps maintaining older technology as long as possible as a safety net, 
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while planning future missions that span decades, indicating the depth of its temporal 
horizons. This is consistent with what Orlikowski and Yates (2002) referred to as practice-
based time, a temporal perspective constituted by recurrent human action, in this case, the 
practices through which safety is embedded in the organization.  
Such a view implies that event based timing is not immediate.  Given the length of 
timescales that apply to the technologies and the programs at NASA, applying short term 
temporal frames as a gauge to evaluate organization change success or failure at this 
organization would be premature and overly narrow. The disjuncture between decades-long 
timeframes for projects, and the short-term timeframe of recurrent funding appropriations 
(Conley& Cobb, 2012) compounds the temporal complexity at NASA, necessitating ways to 
manage these competing temporal perspectives. For example, the ‘temporal brokerage’ 
practices identified by Reinecke and Ansari (2015) enabled the organization to develop 
‘ambitemporality’, the ability to manage plural timeframes. Further, a complementary 
approach to exploring the relevance of temporality to NASA would be to consider how 
NASA’s deep structures such as its business logic change over time and the interrelationship 
between these shifts, surface organization change, and change in the external environment.  
 Polyphony has been a fact of life for NASA since its beginning.  NASA is a 
decentralized organization, with ten largely autonomous field centers with some redundancy 
and duplication of activities (Levine, 1992). NASA came into existence in 1958 as a 
conglomeration of three distinct organizations; the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics, the Army Ballistic Missile agency, and parts of the Naval Research Laboratory. 
Much needed integration across these entities never adequately took place (Levine, 1992).  
Further, NASA’s schedule is not just defined by its own plans and desires.  Its decades-long 
project horizons have to somehow coexist with the political 4-year horizons of government, 
and the often more immediate expectations of the general public.  The causes of failed 
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projects at NASA can often be found outside the organization. For example, a policy change 
can obviate a previously supportive environment for an ongoing, multi-decade mission.  In 
other words, failure is rarely the result of events taking place in a single organization or a part 
of it. 
Discussion 
Summary of our exploration 
We have referred to three levels of change based on their depth of understanding,  
change as intervention, as process, and as structuration.  From a structuration perspective, 
when failure of change is being analysed, authors (e.g. Heracleous & Barrett, 2001, 
Schwieger et al., 2001) view change failure in a similar way as in the intervention (Kotter, 
1996, Nutt, 1992), and process views of change (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987). That is, change 
failure occurs when a change program or initiative fail to deliver their goals within time and 
budget. What is different however is attributions of failure, that are informed by the particular 
view of change that is adopted.   
As can be seen in Table 1, those seeing change and change failure on a surface level 
(the “change as intervention” perspective) tend to focus on straightforward causal processes 
as the reasons for failure and view failure as the end of a chain of events where the proper 
change approach has not been followed. As Table 2 notes, Dimensions of deep structures 
such as values, norms or power may be present in analyses from this perspective but are not 
deeply examined or understood as deep structures that may shape surface events. Consistent 
with the pragmatic, situational approach of accomplishing change goals within a specific 
timeframe following a particular process, prevalent temporality dimensions employed are 
clock time, urgency, present and future temporal focus.  
   -------------------------------------------------------- 
    Table 2 about here 
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Those who focus on the “change as process” perspective are more likely to see change 
failure as part of a larger pattern that may or may not be linear, but there is typically not a 
great deal of explicit attention to deeper processes, as Table 2 notes. Consistent with the 
interests of this perspective of understanding change processes along multiple dimensions 
over time, prevalent temporal dimensions employed incorporate and go beyond those of the 
“change as intervention” perspective to include event time, temporal depth, and polyphony.  
Those who view change from a structuration perspective see it as occurring across 
both surface and deep levels over time.  It may dialectical and contradictory and does not 
have to take a particular linear path.  Deep structure dimensions are explicitly researched here 
(e.g. Heracleous & Barrett, 2001;  Howard & Geist, 1995; Witmer, 1997). Prevalent 
temporality perspectives pay less attention to short-term aspects such as clock time and 
urgency in favour of longitudinal, longer-term aspects such as incorporating past, present and 
future perspectives as well as reversible time.  
As the structuration perspective makes evident, change and change failure cannot be 
adequately understood on surface levels.  Rather, the surface level is the stage for particular 
change programs that are influenced and constrained by deep structures (Dandridge et al., 
1980; Gersick, 1991). These deep structures in turn provide stability by means of both 
shaping surface events, as well as through the generative contradictions and paradoxes that 
characterize them (e.g. Smith & Lewis, 2011). They thus have a formative role in molding 
and constraining the successes and failures of organization change, however these are 
considered. 
Stevenson, Bartunek and Borgatti (2003), for example, studied an organization change 
program at a school where a new role was created that was charged with increasing links 
between different school departments. They showed that even when change agents did not 
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perceive any change at the surface level at the end of the school year, at the deeper level there 
were contradictory movements both towards the change (more connections among 
individuals) and against it (higher structural autonomy of groups and individuals). In other 
words, outcomes of organizational change are more complex than is obvious on the surface.  
This study suggests the value of focusing simultaneously on many levels simultaneously in 
studying and conducting change. 
Where do we go from here? 
How can we pay heed to these considerations? Alice’s conversation with the Cheshire 
cat gives us a starting point.  She started the conversation by asking:  
‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to', said the Cat. 
'I don't much care where-', said Alice. 
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go', said the Cat.  
‘-so long as I get somewhere', Alice added as an explanation. 
'Oh, you're sure to do that', said the Cat, 'if you only walk long enough'. 
Where do we want to “get to” with organizational change and change failure?  This 
may sound like a simple question, but as we have shown in our discussion of deep structures 
and temporality, it is actually a profound one that recognizes that organizational change and 
attributions of failure are about much more, and deeper, than narrow surface aims without 
regard to what else is involved in any change over extended time periods.  Change is sure to 
get somewhere. 
The focus on incremental extension of theory rather than re-conceptualization of key 
aspects of change, and in our case change failure, have created theoretical straightjackets that 
have held the field captive to its own pre-existing theories (Schwarz & Stensaker, 2014). 
However, we suggest three ways, all inspired by the example of wonderland, that may help 
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expand this “thematic narrowness” (Schwarz, 2009) that has characterized organization 
change research (with implied understandings of failure) for decades.  
First, scholars and practitioners can adopt a more reflective approach to organization 
change, including attributions of failure based on the view of change adopted. Van de Ven 
and Sun (2011) identify two modes of engagement with the process of change, the “action 
strategy” and the “reflection strategy”. In the action strategy change outcomes are compared 
with the change agents’ expectations and this leads to an evaluation of change success or 
failure. In this strategy, change agents adopt an action-oriented, problem-solving approach, 
they diagnose the situation and intervene to correct the situation if the change is not following 
the prescribed, expected pattern; the very process criticized early on by Greiner (1967). This 
is consistent with what we labelled “change as intervention”.  
The “reflection strategy” (Van de Ven & Sun, 2011), consistent with Barrett’s (2012a) 
discussion of jazz as well as process and structuration approaches to change, suggests that 
change agents and scholars alike can give primacy to how change unfolds rather than to their 
pre-determined expectations, and try to fit their mental models and their emergent theoretical 
frames instead to the empirical context.  
Worley and Mohrman’s (2011: 217) “new theory of changing” for example involves 
ongoing cycles of awareness, design, tailoring and monitoring. Further, Pasmore (2011) 
suggests moving beyond consideration of single change programs towards continuous change 
that involves ongoing management of competing priorities, integrating multiple change 
efforts, and pursuing a feasible number of projects depending on the organization’s capacity 
to change. The reflection strategy, with its primacy on organizational unfolding rather than on 
prescribed expectations, is more sensitive to recognizing and researching considerations of 
deep structures and time as they shape the organization change process.  
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Further, the reflection strategy involves moving away from assuming that every 
change intervention that doesn’t work is necessarily a failure, and, instead, recognizes errors 
that occur and uses these as opportunities for learning.  As Michael and Mirvis (1977: 317) 
suggested, this means “that errors in nonroutine situations are neither shameful nor best 
responded to by punishment”.  Further, it implies becoming “learners as persons and 
organizations … learning how to become learners, and to be learners we must become 
embracers of error”.  Thus also, a “central criterion of competence is the ability to facilitate 
learning, error embracing, and awareness in one's self and others”.  Wonderland is a place 
where errors abound, and none of them are definitive failures.  This, of course, assumes a 
broad enough temporal depth so that errors can be incorporated as part of a long term 
appreciation of the nature of change. 
 Second, as we outline in the “methodological focus” column of Table 2, scholars can 
employ research methods and frameworks that are sensitive to, and can capture deep 
structures and temporal dimensions, rather than focusing on episodes where short term 
failure/errors occur. In other words, one-time cross-sectional investigations of perceptions are 
inadequate for studying deeper dimensions of change and longer term studies are required that 
use multiple measures of change (e.g. Amis, Slack and Hinings (2004). 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) on which we based our “change as structuration” 
approach can assist in this regard. This theory has three relevant characteristics; first, it 
addresses both surface and deep-level dimensions; second, it encompasses their constitutive 
interactions and interrelations; third, it portrays these interactions taking place over time and 
in recursive patterns. Temporality dimensions are central to structuration theory since deep 
structures are enacted, perpetuated or challenged through routinised interactions over time 
(Heracleous, 2013). Giddens (1995: 28) drew a connection between surface practices and 
deeper institutional dimensions, suggesting that the “structural practices of social systems 
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‘bind’ the temporality of the duree of the day-to-day life-world to the longue duree of 
institutions”. His concept of “reversible time” (Giddens, 1984: 35) highlights the recursive 
and routine nature of practices that connects them to deeper institutional dimensions, such as 
temporal focus and temporal depth, each of which places shorter-term temporal notions for 
accomplishing a specific predetermined change in a larger context.  
For example, Heracleous and Barrett (2001) employed a structurational approach in 
their study of how organization change in the London Insurance Market was shaped by the 
argumentations in use that framed the interpretations and actions of change agents and 
organizational actors more broadly in that context. They treated organizational discourse as a 
duality of communicative actions and deep structures and employed argumentation analysis to 
identify surface and deeper elements of discourse. They showed that shifts in the central 
themes and structure of arguments were associated with shifts in the trajectory of the change 
process, and that ultimate change failure could be illuminated by identifying arguments that 
acted as deep structures that constrained transformational change.   
Consistent with polyphony (Barrett, 2012a), this study found that the differing deep 
structures of various key stakeholders, particularly in how they interpreted new technology, 
led to them talking past rather than to each other, leading to the eventual failure of 
organization change in this market. It should be noted that even using an approach that treats 
deep structures and temporality as inherent to change, these authors also treated change 
failure as the inability of market leaders to implement new technologies into the risk 
placement process of the London insurance market. That is, the view of change failure in this 
study was the change goals were not met within time and budget. But the attributions of 
change failure were different than the “change as intervention” view of change, along the 
lines we describe in Table 1.  
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 Third, as we outline in the “prevalent temporal dimensions” column of Table 2, both 
scholars and practitioners can incorporate multiple and expanded conceptions of time in 
organization change research and in their interventions, in a way that is sensitive not just to 
particular change programs or even to a longitudinal timeframe of a few years, but rather 
ideally to a historical, decades-long temporal focus and depth, using a variety of conceptions 
of time. As we outlined in our extended NASA vignette, temporal depth is modelled by this 
organization, and can properly account for the influence of elements of deep structures, as 
well as different conceptions of time in particular contexts and how these may interact. Our 
Xerox vignette also showed how deep structures can remain largely unaltered even after 
decades of apparently successful change interventions in the form of restructurings, and that 
this is harmful in the long run when the external environment is changing in ways that the 
organization cannot adequately respond to.    
The incorporation of a historical timeframe should be done in terms of what Kipping 
and Usdiken (2014) refer to as “history in theory”, “the use of the past as an integral part of 
the theoretical model itself” (p. 541, emphasis in original), rather than “history to theory”, the 
use of history to inform or extend existing theories.  In other words, it would reflect a 
temporal focus that explicitly includes the past as well as the present and future on an 
institutional scale, and traces the interconnections and interdependencies among them. 
Organizations incorporate multi-levelled temporal dimensions. The temporality of 
organizational change programs is nested in, and interrelated with, the broader temporality of 
organizational life cycles and event cycles. These are in turn encompassed in the longer term 
temporality of deep structures. It would be potentially fruitful for further research to explore 
these nested temporal dynamics and how they interact. Such an undertaking would provide 
useful perspective on the success or failure of surface change programs.  
Conclusion 
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All of these recommendations, of course, reflect Alice’s adventures in Wonderland.  
They acknowledge the enduring contradictions to be found there, the non-linear temporal 
dimensions, and the fact that Wonderland existed quite well holding these contradictions.   
Although it might appear to be no more than a children’s story, Alice in Wonderland actually 
does a magnificent job of conveying the life to be found even when order is not well 
maintained.  Understandings of failure that too soon assume away such contradictions are 
impoverishing the potential for organizational change.   
 What might Alice, following her experience in Wonderland, suggest to change agents 
who, assuming that they are operating on the surface, discover to their surprise that they have 
followed her down the rabbit hole?  With much more colourful language than we are using, 
she might suggest that change agents have a broader view of change failure and not be quick 
to adversely judge a change process that does not seem to reach its goals in the short run.  She 
might remind them that surface events are not all that occurs, that there are interrelated deeper 
dimensions that are instrumental to change processes, and that they may be more or less 
consistent with what seems to be happening on the surface.  Further, these deeper dimensions 
likely do not operate based on the causal logics assumed by many of those who study and 
initiate change, but in much more complex ways.  She might remind them that despite the 
Queen of Hearts’ instinctive cry of “off with their heads”, no one in Wonderland was ever 
executed.  Rather, errors can be made, and learning can take place.  She might remind change 
agents and scholars to pay attention to temporal diversity beyond clock and event time, to 
take temporal focus and temporal depth seriously, and appreciate what they mean in practice.  
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TABLE 1 
Change Failure and its Attributions in Different Views of Change 
View of change Indicative authors View of change failure Attributions of change failure 
Change as intervention 
Change as goal-oriented, linear 
process, characterized by a 
number of stages or consecutive 
steps needed to reach goal 
Beer & Nohria (2000), Greiner 
(1972), Jorgensen et al. (2009, 
2014), Nutt (1992), Kotter 
(1995), Kanter (1999), Lewin 
(1947) 
When change goals, within 
time and budget, are not met 
Lack of proper planning, 
insufficient resources or 
leadership, inadequate 
communication, or actions 
inconsistent with change model 
employed 
 
Change as process 
Change as incremental or radical, 
multi-directional, occurring 
simultaneously on several 
organizational dimensions. From 
a “strong process” perspective 
change is an ontological state of 
organizations 
Bartunek & Woodman (2005), 
Dutton & Duncan (1987), 
Johnson (1987), Pettigrew 
(1985, 1987, 1992), Pettigrew, 
Woodman & Cameron (2001), 
Sitkin (1992), Tsoukas & Chia 
(2002) 
When change goals, within 
time and budget, are not met.  
From a “strong process” 
perspective change failure is 
not highlighted as a theme, 
since change is ongoing and an 
ontological state of 
organizations 
 
Failure is due to dis-junctures 
and tensions across changes 
occurring along multiple 
organizational dimensions.  
From a strong process 
perspective, change failure is 
rooted in particular inertial 
antecedents in the ongoing flow 
of events 
Change as structuration 
Change occurs at interrelated 
levels of surface events and deep 
structures over time. Can be 
dialectical and contradictory 
Farjoun (2010), Heracleous & 
Barrett (2001), Giddens (1984), 
Gersick (1991), Light (1979), 
Macintosh & Maclean (1999), 
Schwieger et al. (2004) 
When change goals, within 
time and budget, are not met  
Disjuncture of changes 
occurring on the surface vs 
changes (or lack of them) 
occurring in deep structures; 
polyphonic and competing 
conceptualizations of change 
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TABLE 2 
Deep Structures and Temporality in Different Views of Change 
View of change Role of deep structures Prevalent temporality 
dimensions 
Methodological focus 
Change as intervention 
Change as goal-oriented, linear 
process, characterized by a number 
of stages or consecutive steps needed 
to reach goal 
Relevant dimensions such as 
values, resource control and 
power are present, but not 
conceptualized as deep 
structures that are mutually 
interrelated and shape surface 
events 
 
Clock time, urgency, 
present and future 
temporal focus 
Attention to change-related 
actions as guided by model of 
change employed, and their 
outcomes; studies of change 
as discrete events with a 
beginning and an end 
Change as process 
Change as incremental or radical, 
multi-directional, occurring 
simultaneously on several 
organizational dimensions. From a 
“strong process” perspective change 
is an ontological state of 
organizations 
 
Relevant dimensions such as 
values, resource control and 
power are present, but not 
conceptualized as deep 
structures that are mutually 
interrelated and shape surface 
events 
Clock time, urgency, 
present and future 
temporal focus, event 
time, temporal depth, 
polyphony 
Focus on change-related 
actions and their outcomes, 
on organizational context, and 
on ongoing processes; 
longitudinal approach 
Change as structuration 
Change occurs at interrelated levels 
of surface events and deep structures 
over time. Can be dialectical and 
contradictory 
Deep structures, with 
signification, domination and 
legitimation dimensions, seen as 
persistent features of 
organizations that shape surface 
events 
 
Event time, past, present 
and future temporal 





with focus on how deep 
structures and surface 
dimensions interact over 
time, as well as on nested 
temporal dynamics 
 
 
